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RAILING AGAINST CYBER IMPERIALISM:  
DISCUSSING THE ISSUES SURROUNDING THE PENDING APPEAL OF 
UNITED STATES V. MICROSOFT CORP. 
 
Jason Young Green* 
 
The United States government was granted a wide berth of 
surveillance powers post 9/11. At a time when Americans felt 
vulnerable to foreign attack, the executive branch passed the USA 
PATRIOT Act that balanced a reduction of privacy rights with a 
promise of increased national security. Twelve years later, Edward 
Snowden released documents showing exactly how pervasive U.S. 
intelligence gathering had become. Now, in a post-Snowden world, 
Americans are struggling to balance privacy rights with national 
security and effective law enforcement. The recent appeal of the 
Microsoft Corporation, which involves a warrant for the 
extraterritorial information of a foreign subject, highlights this 
struggle and brings it into the spotlight. This Recent Development 
argues that such extraterritorial warrants are beyond the powers 
of the executive branch, and need to be tempered by judicial, if not 
congressional, review. Further, the United States bypassing 
established treaties and the privacy laws of those nations in order 
to obtain this information could be seen as aggression against 
foreign nations. This Article further explores and recommends 
legal reforms that better accommodate the international nature of 
the internet and the laws of sovereign nations. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The privacy debate is reaching critical mass in the United 
States as foreign and domestic policy makers attempt to make 
sense of a post-Snowden world. In the summer of 2013, Edward 
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Snowden, a former National Security Agency (“NSA”) systems 
administrator, shocked the world with the revelation that Big 
Brother1 really was watching.2 The documents he released revealed 
that the United States government was not only spying on 
foreigners, but also on its own citizens.3 In the fervor that followed 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 the government granted 
sweeping powers to its intelligence agencies in its War on Terror. 
When Snowden blew the whistle on the breadth of the NSA’s 
spying—such as bullying tech giants Verizon, Sprint, and Google 
into handing over customer information—it became clear that the 
government had overstepped its bounds.4 Since the first Snowden 
release, the media has been inundated with stories of privacy 
breaches and hacks.  
Tech firms are now fighting back. In what should prove to be a 
landmark decision for international and privacy law, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is currently 
weighing whether information stored by a United States company 
on foreign servers can bypass international laws and treaties and be 
recovered under a search and seizure warrant.5 In December 2013, 
a U.S. magistrate judge issued a search warrant on the Microsoft 
Corporation (“Microsoft”), demanding access to emails stored on a 
server in Dublin, Ireland.6 The United States District Court for the 
                                                
1 “Big Brother” alludes to George Orwell’s dystopian novel 1984. The novel 
is set in world of perpetual war, omnipresent government surveillance, and 
public manipulation. See generally GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Signet Classic 
1950).  
2 Mark Mazzetti & Michael S. Schmidt, Ex-Worker at C.I.A. Says He Leaked 
Data on Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/06/10/us/former-cia-worker-says-he-leaked-surveillance-data.html. 
3 Id. 
4 See Evan Perez, Telecom Firm Pushed Back on NSA Data Collection, 
Papers Show, CNN (May 15, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/14/us/nsa-
phone-data-telecoms/; see also Shane Harris, Google’s Secret NSA Alliance: The 
Terrifying Deals Between Silicon Valley and the Security State, SALON (Nov. 
16, 2014), http://www.salon.com/2014/11/16/googles_secret_nsa_alliance_the_ 
terrifying_deals_between_silicon_valley_and_the_security_state/.  
5 In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained 
by Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y 2014). 
6 Id. 
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Southern District of New York agreed with the magistrate judge’s 
grounds to issue the warrant.7 However, Microsoft was allowed to 
appeal to the Second Circuit.8 Now the world waits for a decision 
that will change the way nations regard the United States and its 
privacy policies, as this is the first case in which an international 
corporation has challenged a United States search warrant seeking 
data held abroad.9 
The ramifications of this decision will be of a global scale, with 
far-reaching implications for the privacy rights of the citizens of 
every nation as well as the American companies that collect their 
private data.10 Major international technology companies eagerly 
anticipate the Second Circuit’s decision.11 Regardless of whether 
                                                
7 In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained 
by Microsoft Corp., No. 14-2985-CV, 2014 WL 4629624 (S.D.N.Y. Aug 29, 
2014). 
8 Brief for Appellant at 2, Microsoft v. United States, No. 14-2985-cv (2nd 
Cir. 2014). 
9 Joseph Ax, U.S. Judge Orders Microsoft to Submit Customer’s Emails from 
Abroad, REUTERS (July 31, 2014, 4:25PM EDT), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2014/07/31/usa-tech-warrants-idUSL2N0Q61WN20140731. 
10 See generally Katrina vanden Heuvel & Stephen F. Cohen, Edward Snowden: 
A ‘Nation’ Interview, THE NATION (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/ 
article/186129/snowden-exile-exclusive-interview (during the interview, Snowden 
discusses the actions countries are already taking, such as Russia’s new privacy 
regime, and how a ruling in the government’s favor in the present case would 
encourage other countries to seek similar data localization laws. These efforts 
will be explained further in Part II and III); see also Kate Westmoreland, Whose 
Laws Control your Data? The Implications of the Microsoft Search Warrant 
Challenge, STANFORD L. SCH. CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y BLOG (June 23, 
2014), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2014/06/whose-laws-control-your-data-
implications-microsoft-search-warrant-challenge. 
11 The overwhelming support Microsoft has received from its peers and 
competitors is telling. See Brad Smith, Business, Media and Civil Society Speak 
Up in Key Privacy Case, THE OFFICIAL MICROSOFT BLOG (Dec. 15, 2014), 
http://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2014/12/15/business-media-civil-society-speak-
key-privacy-case/ (discussing the ten amici briefs submitted by: twenty-eight 
Tech and Media companies, thirty-five leading computer scientists, and 
twenty-three trade associations and advocacy groups on Microsoft’s behalf). The 
companies represented include Verizon, Apple, Amazon, Cisco, Salesforce, HP, 
eBay, Infor, AT&T, and Rackspace. Id. They also include business 
organizations such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National 
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the decision survives the appeals process, the most important 
aspect of this case is what it reveals about the interaction between 
United States privacy laws, international treaties, and the 
Electronic Communications Protection Act of 1986 (“ECPA”).12 
This decision should inspire the judiciary to rein in overbroad 
executive power and prompt Congress to legislate this matter 
properly.13  
If the United States gets a favorable verdict, the judiciary will 
be approving the executive branch’s continued expansion of 
power; if Microsoft wins, the judiciary will be exercising its 
hallmark right of judicial review, and reinforcing the checks and 
balances that are built into the United States Constitution.  
This Recent Development argues for congressional and judicial 
oversight with respect to prevailing U.S. executive branch attitudes 
towards foreign and domestic privacy affairs. Specifically, the 
Executive has bypassed the review process by the loose use of 
warrants issued under the ECPA and the violation of fundamental 
privacy principles that both the United States and European Union 
(“EU”) adhere to in their unique approaches to privacy policy. Part 
II begins with a survey of the development of EU and U.S. privacy 
policy, both before Snowden’s revelations and after. Part III will 
use that backdrop to frame the privacy issues the Second Circuit 
faces in United States v. Microsoft Corp. Part IV analyzes the 
                                                                                                         
Association of Manufacturers; civil liberties organizations such as the Center for 
Democracy & Technology, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University 
School of Law, and the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard; 
major media companies such as CNN, ABC, Fox News, Forbes, the Guardian, 
Gannett, McClatchy, the Washington Post, the New York Daily News, and the 
Seattle Times. Id. For a complete list, visit http://mscorp.blob.core.windows.net/ 
mscorpmedia/2014/12/Amicus-Briefing-Filers_Supporters2.pdf.  
12 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et. seq. 
13 Orin Kerr, a computer crime law professor at the George Washington School 
of Law, discusses his suggestions for Congress in a Volokh Conspiracy blog post. 
See generally Orin Kerr, What Legal Protections Apply to E-mail Stored Outside 
the U.S.? VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 7, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/07/07/what-legal-protections-apply-to-e-mail-
stored-outside-the-u-s/. 
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ramifications of a decision for each party with discussion of 
international response.  
II.  WHAT A DIFFERENCE A FEW YEARS MAKES: THE 2012–2014 
LANDSCAPE OF EU AND U.S. PRIVACY LAWS 
Before delving into the intricacies of the Microsoft14 case, it is 
important to understand the state of privacy relations between the 
United States and the EU before and after Snowden began leaking 
classified NSA documents. First, this section examines EU and 
U.S. privacy policies that were in place in 2012, the year before 
Snowden began his progressive leak. Second, it will briefly discuss 
what Snowden did in 2013. Lastly, this section reviews the 
changes to EU and U.S. policy post-Snowden. This overview of 
privacy policy provides the background necessary to discuss the 
consequences that the Second Circuit must confront in the 
Microsoft decision. 
A. 2012: EU/U.S. Privacy Pre-Snowden 
Privacy law and the belief that there is a fundamental right to 
privacy is a legal idea that has been percolating for little more than 
a century, with most discussions starting with the 1890 Warren and 
Brandeis piece The Right to Privacy published in the Harvard Law 
Review.15 Advocating for the “right to be let alone” in the context 
of invasive high society articles in the newspapers, the two authors 
started a national and international discussion of whether there is a 
fundamental right to privacy.16  
Fast forwarding to 1980, the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) issued its privacy 
guidelines based primarily on the Fair Information Practice 
Principles (“FIPPs”), which are focused on empowering people to 
control their personal information and safeguards to ensure 
                                                
14 Brief for Appellant, supra note 8. 
15 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).  
16 Id. at 195. 
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adequate data security.17 The five FIPPs are: (1) notice/awareness, 
(2) choice/consent, (3) access/participation, (4) integrity/security, 
and (5) enforcement.18 The OECD report became the basis for 
modern U.S. and EU privacy law; interestingly, both entities took 
diverging views implementing the FIPPs.19  
In the United States, where privacy concerns are counterbalanced 
by First Amendment rights of free expression, a “sectoral” 
approach to privacy developed.20 The sectoral model does not have 
one overarching privacy law, but rather it regulates citizen privacy 
with sector-specific21 laws. Some of these sector-specific laws 
include the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”),22 which protects 
                                                
17 OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of 
Personal Data, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesonthe 
protectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm, (last visited Feb. 
27, 2015). 
18 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS, 
1, 7–11 (June 1998), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
reports/privacy-online-report-congress/priv-23a.pdf. The five basic FIPPS were 
defined as: (1) notice and awareness: “[c]onsumers should be given notice of an 
organization’s information practices before any personal information is collected 
from them;” (2) choice and consent: consumers should have options to control 
how their data is used; (3) access and participation: “. . . an individual’s ability 
both to access data about him or herself . . . and to contest that data’s accuracy 
and completeness,” (4) integrity and security: organizations that collect data 
should ensure that the collected data is accurate and secure; and (5) enforcement 
and redress: enforcement measures, such as regulatory oversight with civil 
and/or criminal penalties for noncompliance, should be implemented to ensure 
that organizations follow the FIPPs. Id.  
19 Christopher Wolf & Winston Maxwell, So Close, Yet So Far Apart: The EU 
and U.S. Visions of a New Privacy Framework, 26 ANTITRUST 8, 9–10 (summer 
2012). 
20 Natasha Singer, Data Privacy Protection Laws, an Ocean Apart, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/technology/consumer-
data-protection-laws-an-ocean-apart.html?_r=0. 
21 The sectoral approach simply refers to certain industries being regulated 
(Healthcare), and certain individuals being regulated (children on the internet), 
while other industries or individuals are left to their own devices. See Robert 
Schriver, You Cheated, You Lied: the Safe Harbor Agreement and Its 
Enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2777, 
2779 (2002). 
22 15 U.S.C. § 6801 et seq.; 16 C.F.R. § 313.1 et seq.; 16 C.F.R. § 314.1 et seq.  
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a person’s privacy interests held by financial institutions, the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”),23 
which protects private health information, and the Child Online 
Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”)24, which protects the personal 
information of children under the age of thirteen. The majority of 
these Acts do not provide private rights of action for citizens when 
their private data has been breached.25 
The prevailing feature of United States privacy law is 
accountability: with few statutes allowing for a private right of 
action, U.S. citizens depend on the Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”) to prosecute privacy violations. In addition to the 
sector-specific laws, the FTC has created standards for how 
businesses may collect, use, and protect the personal information 
of their clients.26 The FTC regulates privacy by taking action 
against businesses for “unfair or deceptive” practices.27 Some 
examples of the FTC’s earliest actions include those against Eli 
Lilly,28 Microsoft,29 and Gateway Learning.30 In addition, in 2011, 
the FTC filed actions against tech giants Google and Facebook.31 
Both companies settled and adopted comprehensive privacy 
programs patterned on the FIPPs.32 These outcomes, at the time, 
were seen as wins—positive signs that the privacy regime in the 
United States was improving; the FTC was heralded as having a 
                                                
23 Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996). 
24 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506. 
25 See id.; Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996). 
26 Wolf & Maxwell, supra note 19, at 9.  
27 15 U.S.C. 45(a).  
28 In re Eli Lilly & Co., 133 F.T.C. 763 (2002). 
29 See Microsoft Corp., FTC File No. 012-3240 (2002), https://www.ftc.gov/ 
enforcement/cases-proceedings/042-3047/gateway-learning-corp-matter. 
30 See Gateway Learning Corp., FTC File No. 042-3047 (2004), https://www. 
ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/042-3047/gateway-learning-corp-matter. 
31 See Google, Inc., FTC File No. 102-3136 (2011), https://www.ftc.gov/ 
enforcement/cases-proceedings/102-3136/google-inc-matter; Facebook, Inc., FTC 
File No. 092-3184 (2011), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/ 
092-3184/facebook-inc. 
32 See Google, Inc., supra note 31; Facebook, Inc., supra note 31; see also 
Wolf & Maxwell, supra note 19. 
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“major role in preventing violations of consumers’ expectations of 
privacy in the United States.”33  
On the other side of the Atlantic, the EU enacted a 
comprehensive Directive that regulates every piece of personal 
information and establishes privacy as a fundamental human 
right.34 This across-the-board privacy regime gives each EU citizen 
a right of action should their rights be violated. So zealously does 
the EU guard its citizens’ privacy rights that lawsuits that would be 
standard in the United States end with seemingly bizarre results in 
Europe. For example, in Italy, three Google executives were 
convicted of invasion of privacy for failing to block a YouTube 
video of a group of students bullying a disabled classmate.35 
Perhaps the most succinct difference between EU and U.S. 
privacy policy is the European Court of Justice’s (“ECJ”) 
declaration that EU citizens have a “right to be forgotten,”36 a 
sentiment that would seem strange to most Americans.37 The case 
was filed in 2010, when a Spanish plaintiff complained to Google 
Spain, Google Inc., and a Spanish newspaper that notice of the 
plaintiff’s repossessed home on Google’s Spanish search engine 
infringed his right to privacy.38 The plaintiff’s argument before the 
                                                
33 Wolf & Maxwell, supra note 19, at 9. 
34 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data and on the Free movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 
(1995), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= 
CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML.  
35 Kit Eaton, Italy Convicts Google Execs on Privacy Invasion Charges, Revisits 
Dark Ages, FAST CO. (Feb. 24, 2010, 12:55AM), http://www.fastcompany.com/ 
1560995/italy-convicts-google-execs-privacy-invasion-charges-revisits-dark-ages. 
36 See Google Spain v. Agencia Espanola De Proteccion de Datos, infra note 38. 
37 California has enacted a limited form of this effective January 2015, called 
the Children’s Right to be Forgotten Act, dealing primarily with access to 
information about a person prior to their 18th birthday (social media, etc). S.B. 
568, 2013-14 Sess., (Ca. 2013).  
38 Case C-131/12, Google Spain v. Agencia Espanola De Proteccion de Datos, 
2013 CURIA (June 25, 2013), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document. 
jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d2dc30dda9fa02f973a74005a72486437479f81b.e34KaxiLc3
qMb40Rch0SaxuPb3n0?text=&docid=138782&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&m
ode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=416611. In its decision, the ECJ held that 
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ECJ was that he, as a realtor, had the right to have the information 
removed because the incident had been fully addressed years 
before, and the information posted harmed his business.39 The ECJ 
granted the plaintiff’s request that the newspaper be required to 
remove or alter the pages in question and that Google Spain or 
Google Inc. be required to remove the information from the 
internet.40 
Furthermore, the EU so vigorously protects the privacy of its 
citizens that before any data containing personal information about 
an EU citizen is sent overseas, the receiving country’s privacy 
policies must be reviewed and approved by the EU Commission.41 
The EU has deemed U.S. privacy policies as being inadequate.42 
As such, companies in the United States that wish to receive and 
process data about European customers must implement and 
adhere to strict rules that follow EU privacy guidelines.43 
                                                                                                         
an Internet search engine operator is responsible for the processing that it carries 
out of personal information that appears on web pages published by third 
parties. The outcome of the ruling is that an Internet search engine must consider 
requests from individuals to remove links to freely accessible web pages 
resulting from a search on their name. Grounds for removal include cases where 
the search result(s) appear to be inadequate, irrelevant, or excessive in the light 
of the time that had elapsed. If the search engine rejects the request, the 
individual may ask relevant authorities to consider the case. Under certain 
conditions, the search engine may be ordered to remove the links from search 
results. 
39 Id. 
40 Id.  
41 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data and on the Free movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 
(1995), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= 
CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML; Frequently Asked Questions Related to Transfers 
of Personal Data from the EU?EEA to Third Countries, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
justice/policies/privacy/docs/international_transfers_faq/international_transfers_
faq.pdf 
42 Welcome to the U.S.-EU & U.S.-Swiss Safe Harbor Frameworks, http:// 
export.gov/safeharbor/ (last updated Feb. 19, 2015, 11:47 AM). 
43 Binding Corporate Rules (“BCRs”), utilization of Model Contracts set forth 
by the EU, or participation in the EU-US Safe Harbor program are currently the 
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Despite this U.S. sectoral approach versus the EU’s 
comprehensive approach to privacy, efforts were underway in 
2012 to harmonize existing laws and to set a global standard for 
protection. United States officials even conjectured that the 
divergent approaches were at least equal, with the “sum of the 
parts of U.S. privacy protection [being] equal to or greater than the 
single whole of Europe.”44 In 2012, President Obama submitted a 
proposed Consumer Bill of Rights, which would move U.S. 
privacy policies more in line with those of the EU.45 It appeared 
that a golden age of global privacy was being ushered in.  
B. 2013: The Snowden Event 
Before June 5, 2013, the world did not know the name Edward 
Snowden. On June 5, he released the first wave of documents he 
had obtained while working as a high-ranking systems 
administrator for the NSA.46 Overnight, he became famous: the 
world obsessed over the revelation that the U.S. government had 
ordered telecommunications giant Verizon to hand over data under 
the USA PATRIOT Act.47 On the following day, more classified 
documents that Snowden had collected were released, unveiling 
the NSA’s PRISM program whereby the government had access to 
voicemails, emails, texts, photos, videos, and files from the biggest 
tech firms in the United States.48  
                                                                                                         
only ways in which U.S. companies are allowed to handle the personal data of 
EU citizens.  
44 See Singer, supra note 20 (quoting Cameron Kerry, General Counsel for the 
U.S. Department of Commerce).  
45 Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A Framework for Protecting 
Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global Digital Economy (Feb. 2012), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf.  
46 Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to User 
Data of Apple, Google and Others, THE GUARDIAN (June 7, 2013), http://www. 
theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data. 
47 Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon 
Customers Daily, THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order. 
48 Id. 
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As the months rolled by, Snowden slowly released more 
documents revealing the breadth of U.S. surveillance, both 
domestically and abroad.49 The world reeled with the revelation 
that the NSA operated with a “collect it all” mentality.50 The 
method was developed in 2005 by the then newly appointed NSA 
director, General Keith B. Alexander, as a means to mitigate U.S. 
troop loss from improvised explosive devices (“IEDs”).51 The plan, 
Real Time Regional Gateway, which collected every Iraqi text 
message, phone call, and e-mail, played a role in breaking up Iraqi 
insurgent networks and significantly reduced the IED death toll by 
late 2008.52 Alexander’s driving goal, spurred by the lack of 
intelligence that preceded the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, 
                                                
49 See Nicole Perlroth, et al., N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of Privacy 
on Web, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/ 
nsa-foils-much-internet-encryption.html?_r=0; see also Barton Gellman & 
Ashkan Soltani, NSA Collections Millions of E-mail Address Books Globally, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 14 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/nsa-collects-millions-of-e-mail-address-books-globally/2013/10/14/8e58b5 
be-34f9-11e3-80c6-7e6dd8d22d8f_story.html; James Ball, et al., Revealed: How 
US and UK Spy Agencies Defeat Internet Privacy and Security, THE GUARDIAN 
(Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-
encryption-codes-security. 
50 Glenn Greenwald, The Crux of the NSA Story in One Phrase: Collect it All, 
THE GUARDIAN (July 15, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/ 
2013/jul/15/crux-nsa-collect-it-all; Ellen Nakashima & Joby Warrick, For NSA 
Cheif, Terrorist Threat Drives Passion to ‘Collect it All,’ WASH. POST (July 14, 
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/for-nsa-chief-
terrorist-threat-drives-passion-to-collect-it-all/2013/07/14/3d26ef80-ea49-11e2-
a301-ea5a8116d211_story.html. (“[N]ew details of the spy agency’s vast reach 
were brought to light last month by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden, 
. . . who leaked classified information on government programs that sweep up 
‘metadata’ on phone calls and e-mails by Americans. Those revelations in turn 
have spotlighted the role played by Alexander, the NSA’s avuncular leader and, 
by all accounts, a driving force behind a post-Sept. 11, 2001, quest to transform 
an agency inundated by the data revolution into one that can exploit it to defend 
the nation.”). 
51 Nakashima & Warrick, supra note 50.  
52 Id. 
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was to transform the NSA from “an agency inundated by the data 
revolution into one that can exploit it to defend the nation.”53 
Privacy rights of the individual are constantly at war with 
effective law enforcement principles. Alexander, as head of the 
NSA, was entrusted with the duty to protect the United States from 
terrorist threats both at home and abroad. The steps that he took to 
analyze and act on data that he collected that led to the reduction of 
U.S. soldier deaths are noteworthy.54 However, the government did 
not fail in its mission to “collect it all” in its execution, but in its 
oversight.55 Gen. Alexander frequently points out that the NSA 
collection programs are subject to oversight by Congress as well as 
the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.56 However, the 
proceedings of these two bodies are secret.57 This lack of 
transparent oversight has given the NSA a wide berth in its 
operations, in violation of the FIPPS that both EU and U.S. privacy 
frameworks are based on, specifically the fundamentals of Notice 
and Consent.58 By having secret FISA court orders and ECPA 
warrants that are rarely, if ever, unsealed, citizens targeted by NSA 
are never notified of the invasion of their privacy, and thus have no 
control over it.59 It is this lack of oversight that has allowed the NSA 
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55 Charlie Savage & Laura Poitras, How a Court Secretly Evolved, Extending 
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03/12/us/how-a-courts-secret-evolution-extended-spies-reach.html. 
56 Nakashima & Warrick, supra note 50. 
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C. 2014 and Beyond: EU/US Privacy Post-Snowden 
The White House has moved slowly in reforming the NSA and 
U.S. spy policies, reportedly maintaining that the system was legal, 
but needs to be changed in order to “reassure a skeptical public.”60 
Proposals have been met with resistance, however, as the makeup 
of Congress has shifted to become Republican-dominated and 
political pressure from outside threats, such as the Paris terrorist 
attacks, keep the world on edge.61 U.S. tech companies have lost 
significant business and are concerned the impact of the Snowden 
revelations will continue to hurt their bottom lines.62 Foreign 
governments are instituting new policies that seek alternatives to 
American technology for fear of NSA spying. In March 2014, the 
European Parliament passed the Data Protection Regulation and 
Directive, imposing strict limits on the handling of EU citizens’ 
data.63 This law requires that anyone handling the data of European 
                                                
60 Tom Cohen, et al, Obama, Congress Working on Changes to NSA, CNN 
(Mar. 25, 2014, 4:32 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/25/politics/white-house-nsa/; 
see also Julian Hattem, NSA Reform Facing Hard Sell Following Paris Terror 
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by President Obama in January of 2014, which called for the end of the NSA’s 
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61 Ellen Nakashima & Ed O’Keefe, Senate Fails to Advance Legislation on NSA 
Reform, WASH. POST (Nov. 18, 2014) http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ 
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Michael Hayden said on MSNBC after Wednesday’s shooting [in Paris], the worst 
act of Terror France has seen in generations.”). 
62 Laura Donohue, High Technology, Consumer Privacy, and U.S. National 
Security, BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming) (citing Michael Hickens, Spying Fears 
Abroad Hurt U.S. Tech Firms, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/SB10001424052702303743604579350611848246016) (“The Information 
Technology and Innovation Fund estimates that data privacy rules could retard 
the growth of the technology industry by up to four percent, impacting U.S. 
companies’ ability to expand and forcing them out of existing markets.”). 
63 Id. European Parliament legislative resolution of 12 March 2014 on the 
proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation 
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citizens “must obtain the consent of the data subjects to having 
their personal information processed,” and further requires that the 
citizens retain a right to later withdraw this consent.64 Too, the 
Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs Committee of the 
European Parliament recently passed a resolution that calls for the 
end of the U.S./EU Safe Harbor program.65  
Other nations around the world are also altering how they treat 
cloud data and how they interact with the United States. Russia 
passed a law that requires foreign Internet companies to store 
Russian users’ personal data within Russian borders to prevent 
tampering by the United States.66 Brazil passed a new law that 
prohibits the disclosure, absent a Brazilian court order, of 
communications stored, collected, or processed in Brazil or for 
communications in which one party is in Brazil.67 The Chinese are 
even ripping American technology out of their systems for fear of 
NSA spying or circumstances similar to the present issue in 
Ireland.68  
The Snowden revelations made privacy an international 
concern. From its humble beginnings in the Warren and Brandeis 
piece in 1890 to today’s constant stream of corporate and 
government intrusion, the feeling that there is some fundamental 
right to be protected has grown exponentially. The cause of this 
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Foreign Internet Companies, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/ 
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67 See Brazilian Civil Rights Framework for the Internet (Marco Civil da 
Internet), Law No. 12.965 (Apr. 23, 2014) (Braz.). Unofficial English translation, 
available at https://www.publicknowledge.org/assets/uploads/documents/ 
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exponential-explosion is the pervasive nature of the modern 
Internet. The Warren and Brandeis “right to be let alone” at social 
events has evolved into the European Court of Justice’s declaration 
that E.U. citizens have a “right to be forgotten” by search engines. 
This radical leap has been greatly influenced by the advent of the 
Internet. The Internet is pervasive in today’s business and society, 
and the implications of data farms and cloud computing complicate 
privacy regimes that differ from state to state, and nation to nation.   
III.  UNITED STATES V. MICROSOFT, CORP. IN THE 
POST-SNOWDEN WORLD 
On December 4, 2013, a magistrate in the Southern District of 
New York issued a warrant that directed Microsoft to produce 
content and non-content information about a user whose account is 
associated with its Dublin, Ireland datacenter.69 Microsoft’s 
wholly-owned subsidiary, Microsoft Ireland Operations, Ltd., 
leases and operates the datacenter.70 Microsoft began storing email 
data there in September 2010.71 Microsoft stores users’ email 
information at datacenters around the world and assigns users to 
different datacenters according to proximity in order to increase 
communications quality and decrease network latency.72 When a 
user signs up for email service, he or she is prompted to enter a 
country code that Microsoft uses to decide where to locate the 
user’s data.73 Microsoft maintains non-content metadata associated 
with the account in the US. 
The warrant was issued under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure.74 Rule 41 is silent as to whether it has 
                                                
69 Government’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Microsoft’s Motion 
to Vacate Email Account Warrant, Exhibit A, In re Warrant to Search a Certain 
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extraterritorial effect.75 Microsoft produced the non-content data 
stored in the United States but objected to producing the content 
information stored in the Ireland datacenter.76 On December 18, 
2013, Microsoft moved to vacate the warrant for that content.77 The 
magistrate judge rejected Microsoft’s motion to vacate.78  
On July 31, 2014, the Southern District of New York upheld 
the magistrate judge on appeal.79 It upheld the extraterritorial 
execution of the warrant and held Microsoft in contempt for 
refusing to comply.80 The Southern District of New York ruled that 
when Congress used the term “warrant,” it actually meant a 
“hybrid” subpoena, indistinguishable from the type that can 
compel a bank to produce its own transaction records from a 
foreign branch.81 It concluded that, so long as no federal agents go 
on Irish soil, no impermissible extraterritorial action occurs.82 
Microsoft argues that the courts presume that federal statutes 
do not apply extraterritorially unless Congress expresses a clear 
intent for them to do so.83 It also contends that Congress did not 
indicate in the ECPA that Congress intended to authorize federal 
and local police to commandeer service providers to execute 
searches and seizures of private emails located in foreign 
countries.84 In addition, Microsoft’s brief argues that Congress did 
not express any intention to permit the U.S. government to ignore 
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76 In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained 
by Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y 2014).. 
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by Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d at 472 (S.D.N.Y 2014).  
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established avenues for international cooperation, such as Mutual 
Legal Assistance Treaties, to obtain such evidence.85 The question 
on appeal, Microsoft states, is whether US law enforcement may 
nevertheless invoke ECPA to conscript providers to search and 
seize private emails in a foreign country.86 
The U.S. government filed its response on March 9, 2015.87 It 
continues to applaud Magistrate Judge Francis’ conclusion that 
nothing in the text, structure, or legislative history of the SCA 
indicated that “Congress intended to limit the ability of law 
enforcement agents to obtain account information from domestic 
service providers who happen to store that information overseas.”88 
The U.S. government’s chief argument echoes that of Judge 
Francis, stating that the “purpose of the SCA demonstrates that the 
imposition of a warrant requirement has nothing to do with the 
physical location of the relevant records.”89 
Thus a central issue in the Second Circuit’s deliberation of 
Microsoft is that of location: the U.S. government wants to obtain, 
through Microsoft, a subject’s personal information that is located 
in the EU member country of Ireland.90 In its appeal to the Second 
Circuit, Microsoft argues, along with numerous amici, that the U.S. 
government has placed the company between the proverbial rock 
and a hard place.91 Their options are either to respect Irish laws and 
                                                
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Brief for Appellee, Microsoft v. United States, No. 14-29850cv (2nd Cir. 
2014). 
88 In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained 
by Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y 2014). 
89 Brief for Appellee, supra note 88 at 30; see also In re Warrant to Search a 
Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 15 F. 
Supp. 3d at 471. 
90 Brief for Appellant, supra note 8 at 2. 
91 See id. at 2–4; Brief for Verizon Comm. Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Appellants at 1–3, Microsoft v. United States, 2014 WL 7213175 2d 
Cir.) (2014) (No. 14-2985-cv) (“Moreover, because they operate in multiple 
countries, and locate at least some of their servers outside the United States, the 
amici are subject to foreign data protection and privacy laws, which at times 
may conflict with U. S. law. The District Court's ruling threatens to force 
 
16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 172, 189 
Railing Against Cyber Imperialism 
violate the court order (and suffer resulting sanctions from the U.S. 
government), or to violate both Irish laws and international treaties 
in order to comply with the U.S. court order.  
Before discussing how a verdict in either direction will affect 
EU/U.S. privacy concerns, especially in the realm of U.S. tech 
companies, this Recent Development provides an overview of the 
technology involved. Microsoft stores its emails in the cloud, and 
alleges that the data the US seeks is physically located on a server 
in an Irish data center.92 Is information stored in the cloud really 
located in any one specific, physical location if it can be accessed 
from anywhere? While the U.S. government seems to think not, 
the private sector overwhelmingly agrees that it is.93  
A. The “Cloud:” What it is Exactly, and its Implications in the 
Microsoft Case 
As the Center for Democracy and Technology succinctly points 
out, the “animating question in this case is whether a U.S. law 
enforcement agency can compel a U.S. provider of 
communications service to disclose the content of digital 
information the provider stores outside of the U.S.”94 The Stored 
Communications Act (“SCA”),95 part of the ECPA, does not 
address this specific issue of cloud-based data storage. The SCA 
authorizes the government to seek the contents of stored 
communications that are more than 180 days old; using a 
                                                                                                         
companies like the amici to choose between complying with a U. S. search 
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subpoena, a warrant, or a court order issued under U.S.C. 
§ 2703(d).96 However, the SCA is silent on whether it is supposed 
to apply only domestically, or whether it applies to data stored 
overseas as well.97 Thus, of central importance is determining 
whether the data the US government seeks is located domestically 
or abroad, and if abroad, whether Congress intended the SCA to 
apply.  
Determining just where particular bits of information are stored 
at any one time in the cloud can be a confusing concept to grasp. 
The U.S. government argues that due to the nebulous nature of 
Microsoft’s cloud, paired with Microsoft’s status as a United States 
corporation, Microsoft has no need to consult Ireland about the 
emails stored in its servers there.98 Microsoft and its amici contend 
that while the cloud seems nebulous, individual files are stored on 
specific servers in specific locations.99  
The cloud can be a funny thing. During a 2014 Super Bowl 
commercial, comedian Amy Poehler campily runs through a Best 
Buy electronic retail store asking employees, “What’s the cloud? 
Where is the cloud? Are we in the cloud now?!”100 To help the 
courts comprehend exactly what the cloud is, computer and data 
science experts told the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in their 
amici briefs that storing data “in the cloud” allows users to access 
the data from anywhere in the world, but that the stored 
information still has a physical location.101 Further, the amici 
contend that network administrators should physically locate the 
                                                
96 Id. § 2703. 
97 Id. § 2703; see also Kerr, supra note 13 (discussing what Congress needs to 
do to amend the SCA for use in extraterritorial situations). 
98 Brief of Government in Support of the Magistrate Judge’s Decision to 
Uphold a Warrant at 12, In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account 
Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014) (No. 13-2814). 
99 Brief for Computer and Data Science Experts, supra note 93. 
100 Super Bowl Extended Amy Poehler Commercial for Best Buy (ABC 
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data in the cloud server close to the physical location of the user in 
order to enhance network speed and efficiency.102  
Due to the nature of cloud storage, the subject of the warrant in 
the Microsoft case is likely an Irish citizen; or, in the least, 
someone who lives in or spends significant time near Dublin, 
Ireland, since the particular emails requested are stored there. For 
the U.S. government to take action against this individual, it must 
cooperate with the Irish government via its Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaty (“MLAT”).103 However, because this is an action 
against a foreign individual’s data stored on servers owned by a 
United States corporation, is the government bypassing 
international law by using a SCA warrant?  
Irish law requires that the United States seek authorization 
from an Irish district court judge in order to obtain the content of 
emails from an electronic communications provider.104 The U.S. 
government has previously recognized international privacy law 
and foreign relations as concerns, even if the prosecutors in this 
case have not.105 The Supreme Court has held that there is a 
“presumption that United States law governs domestically but does 
not rule the world.”106 This presumption would preclude the 
Southern District of New York’s view that the SCA silently 
authorizes U.S. officials to reach any information abroad that 
foreign companies with a U.S. presence can reach from within the 
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United States.107 Microsoft contends that the district court’s 
decision has created international friction that courts are supposed 
to avoid by “ensur[ing] that the Judiciary does not erroneously 
adopt an interpretation of U.S. law that carries foreign policy 
consequences not clearly intended by the political branches.”108 
Orin Kerr, professor of law at George Washington University 
School of Law and scholar on computer crime law and internet 
surveillance, also agrees that the SCA is territorial and should only 
apply to domestic issues.109  
This argument that the SCA only applies domestically 
solidifies that this case is all about location. Is it the location of 
Microsoft’s data servers in Dublin that matters (thus making this 
an international issue seemingly beyond the SCA), or is it the 
location of Microsoft’s headquarters in the United States that 
matters (thus making it susceptible to SCA warrants)? The Second 
Circuit will have to make this particular distinction in this case, 
and the decision is not an easy one. If territoriality is defined by 
where the provider is, then the U.S. government’s act is territorial, 
as it is obtaining data from a U.S. company operating in the United 
States. The location of the data makes no functional difference; 
Microsoft can simply obtain the data remotely via a terminal. 
Further, because the magistrate judge ruled that ECPA warrants are 
hybrids of warrants and subpoenas, it is plausible that all future 
ECPA warrants will resemble that of subpoenas.110 
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On the other hand, if territoriality is defined by the location of 
the data, then the government’s act is extraterritorial. After all, the 
purpose of the statute is to provide privacy protections in the cloud. 
If the statute only applies territorially, then it only applies to the 
data stored in the cloud on servers in the United States. Whether a 
§ 2703(a) warrant is a hybrid subpoena is immaterial; it is a 
creature of statute and has the territoriality limits of the statute that 
enacted it. Thus, the other plausible holding is that the data 
location matters rather than the corporate location. The Second 
Circuit must decide whether the location of Microsoft matters and 
confirm the district court’s decision, or side with Microsoft and 
reverse the decision based on the fact that the data is stored in 
Dublin. 
B. Implications of a Ruling in Favor of the United States 
Either way it rules, the Second Circuit will change the law for 
U.S.-based cloud service providers and foreign governments. If 
Microsoft loses this case, the court will create precedent allowing 
the U.S. government to obtain data stored anywhere in the world 
by a U.S. company with just a search warrant. Such policy will be 
a major concern for cloud companies that host customer data 
outside of the U.S, as evidenced by the overwhelming number of 
amici briefs filed on behalf of Microsoft.111 
Verizon Communications, Inc. argues in its amici brief that the 
decision “could cost U.S. businesses billions of dollars in lost 
revenue, undermine international agreements and understandings, 
and prompt . . . foreign affiliates of American companies to turn 
over the content of customer data stored in the United States.”112 
Apple adds that “failure to address issues of international comity, 
reciprocity and to properly consider the ramifications of applying 
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ECPA extraterritorially, makes it difficult . . . to navigate overlapping 
international laws.”113  
Foreign nations would likely respond with data segregation 
regimes, declaring that all electronic information concerning their 
citizens be stored locally, within that nation’s borders. This would 
be an astronomical cost to major U.S. corporations like Facebook, 
Google, and Apple, which maintain millions of international 
customers. The cost of building and maintaining datacenters in 
every sovereign nation would also set an incredibly high bar for 
entry into the international internet market, limiting the growth of 
small companies here in the United States.  
NSA dissident Edward Snowden has commented on this case, 
echoing similar concerns. In a recent interview he stated that 
Microsoft: 
. . . matters because if we allow the United States to set the precedent 
that national borders don’t matter when it comes to the protection of 
people’s information, other countries are watching. They’re paying 
attention to our examples and what is normative behavior in terms of 
dealing with digital information.114  
He further warned: 
So the question becomes what does, for example, the government in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo or China do the next time they’ve got a 
dissident Nobel Peace Prize nominee and they want to read his e-mail, 
and it’s in an Irish data center? They’re going to say to Microsoft, “You 
handed this stuff over to the DOJ; you’re going to hand the same thing 
over to us.”115 
In such a scenario, China would levy sanctions against a balking 
Microsoft—sanctions that would make Microsoft less competitive 
in the Asian market, simultaneously hurting Microsoft and the 
American economy.116 
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Recall the international effect that the Snowden revelations 
already had on the U.S. tech industry.117 A decision for the U.S. 
government would most likely exacerbate this international distrust 
of American technology, further hindering the U.S. tech industry—
specifically those dealing with cloud technology. 
C. Implications of a Ruling in Favor of Microsoft 
A decision affirming Microsoft’s position would be a win for 
privacy rights and encourage multinational cooperation towards 
establishing a new regime of privacy and internet laws. In the 
words of Microsoft Vice President and General Counsel Brad 
Smith after Ireland filed its amici curiae brief, “The Irish 
government’s engagement underscores that an international 
dialogue on this issue is not only necessary but possible. We’ve 
long argued that it’s best for law enforcement to move forward in a 
way that respects people’s rights under their local laws.”118 Indeed, 
a Second Circuit finding for Microsoft would force the government 
to use the MLAT and cooperate with the Irish, not compel them.   
A ruling for Microsoft would show that companies, if not the 
individuals, are the owners of their cloud-based information, and 
that to get at that information legally the U.S. government must 
follow the laws of the other nations involved. This would prevent 
reactions such as the law Russia has passed, and promote the 
efficient use and growth of the internet.119 This would be a win for 
U.S. tech companies that are trying to restore their global 
reputation post-Snowden and assure customers that using a U.S. 
product is not the same as giving the NSA an open invitation to 
peruse their data.120 
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If the U.S. government is worried about the speed of criminal 
investigation and prosecution—which is exactly what it argued 
before the district court and what the district court agreed with—
then it needs to amend the MLAT to provide for expediency. 
Otherwise the Department of Justice is single-handedly 
determining foreign policy precedent for the United States, which 
is something that the State Department and Congress are supposed 
to negotiate. In the end, a ruling for Microsoft would put a stop to 
the Executive branch’s exploitation of privacy rights and reaffirm 
the judiciary’s role in the system of checks and balances.  
IV.  PROPOSED CHANGES TO RESTORE OVERSIGHT IN U.S. 
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS 
The Microsoft decision should be a catalyst for change as it 
brings the overreaching powers of the Executive branch (in the 
form of the NSA) into the spotlight. The time is ripe for Congress 
or the judiciary to act as a check. As noted above, countries are 
already changing privacy and technology policies with regard to 
the United States. How should the United States. shape its own 
policies going forward: by running roughshod over established 
treaties with other sovereign nations, or by stepping back and 
reevaluating the protections and policies that should protect the 
privacy rights of individuals?  
When you give a soldier an order, he or she follows it. In the 
outrage over the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the United States ordered 
its security agencies to seek out threats to the United States and its 
citizens, giving them sweeping powers in the USA PATRIOT Act. 
The NSA should almost be applauded for what it achieved; the 
“collect it all” mentality of data interception gave the NSA the 
drive to be able to collect the data of nearly any person, whether a 
U.S. citizen or foreign national. This collection machine, if it is to 
be used to protect the United States and its citizens, must be 
regulated. 
A. Suggested Revisions to Law: Promoting Congressional 
Oversight and Judicial Review 
16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 172, 197 
Railing Against Cyber Imperialism 
The ECPA was enacted in 1986 while the Internet was in its 
infancy and cloud computing was still on the horizon. Congress, in 
enacting the Act, could not have imagined that warrants would 
breach international protocol. Quite simply, a procedure used to 
fight crime in the United States should not be capable of obtaining 
information about foreign citizens of sovereign nations that is 
stored extraterritorially. This has the potential to set precedent for 
other nations to adopt equivalent procedures, which would 
inevitably result international chaos. The ECPA should be 
amended with international comity in mind. 
Similarly, Orin Kerr asserts that Microsoft all but obligates 
Congress to amend the SCA.121 “The statute just wasn’t drafted 
with this problem in mind, and Congressional action to create 
explicit rules for how the statute applies abroad would be very very 
welcome.”122 He posits that, “[i]n a perfect world . . . the statute 
would distinguish between people in the U.S. who use U.S. 
providers that just happen to store their contents on servers abroad 
. . . and people abroad whose providers store e-mails abroad but 
also have an office in the U.S.”123 The former would require the 
execution of a U.S. warrant, and the latter would require utilization 
of the MLATs.124 
A proper reform should align the ECPA with the FIPPs, 
discussed above.125 Primarily, any amendment should provide for 
reasonable notice and control to subjects targeted by SCA 
warrants. Currently, individuals targeted by electronic surveillance 
are kept unaware by the presence of gag orders silencing their 
service providers.126 In addition, warrants are generally sealed, 
often indefinitely, with the result that the target is never put on 
notice.127  
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An amended ECPA should allow for notice to the target of any 
electronic surveillance order. Such an amendment could allow for 
the sealing of orders for up to six months, with an extension 
applicable in extenuating circumstances, but disallow the current 
practice of indefinite sealing. Thus targets would be put on notice 
of their private data being collected by U.S. authorities, and have 
the chance to respond. This change to the law would not only 
effectuate transparency in the government, but also allow for 
judicial review. Further, government agencies are less likely to 
seek warrants wantonly—they would be put on a six-month clock 
to make actionable use of the information gathered or their efforts 
would be revealed to the subject. This would be a burden for law 
enforcement officials, but such should be the cost of policing a free 
society. 
Coupled with the inability to permanently seal a record would 
be the insertion of a private right to action. Just as citizens are 
allowed to bring suits against authorities for abuse of power (racial 
profiling, etc.), the ECPA should have a provision that allows a 
citizen to recover damages for the violation of their privacy rights, 
in the form of sanctions against the government, and allowing for 
the recovery of attorney’s fees. This too should deter U.S. 
authorities from frivolously collecting data about subjects without 
a proper cause. Coupled with the notice requirement above, this 
would allow for appropriate judicial review of executive action 
while still allowing the NSA to do its job; except this time, Big 
Brother would also be actively watched.  
Lastly, to assuage the U.S. government’s fears that the MLAT 
process takes too long, there should be a revision to the MLAT for 
expediency in certain situations. For countries that do not have 
MLATs with the United States, standard operating procedures and 
policies should be put into place that allows for higher-ranking 
government officials (at least higher ranking that magistrate 
judges) to call upon foreign state departments for aid.  
B. Policy Considerations: Privacy Policies Moving Forward 
By amending the ECPA to realign with the FIPPs, the United 
States would adopt an international policy of comity and 
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reciprocity. This is not the only type of policy that is implicated, 
however. As noted above, in the United States, the FTC is the 
strong arm of privacy law, regulating based on unfair and 
deceptive trade practices.128 The FTC holds companies accountable 
for the terms and conditions placed within their privacy policies. 
Thus, technology companies are also changing their policies to 
keep government intrusion out and to protect their users.  
Apple, Google, and Facebook have begun encrypting phones, 
data centers, and WhatsApp messages, respectively.129 Currently, 
companies sidestep the government and avoid producing any 
legible documents for review by using data encryption software 
that is accessed by a key that only the user possesses.130 This is 
good for privacy advocates and bad for people who feel that the 
government should have access to that sort of information under 
certain circumstances, especially where national security is 
concerned. If the Second Circuit rules for the United States, more 
companies are likely to adopt policies like these to bypass the 
system altogether.131 Ultimately, for criminal investigation purposes, 
it might be in the government’s best interest to root for a ruling in 
Microsoft’s favor so that fewer tech companies adopt such policies 
and access could be granted in some situations. That is to say, if 
companies keep encrypting their data with strong algorithms—
which they should—ECPA warrants will only return encrypted 
data. 
A second policy to consider is users’ terms of service 
agreements with tech companies. For example, Microsoft’s terms 
of service provide an interesting nuance to the Second Circuit’s 
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deliberations. Microsoft specifies “that different jurisdictions’ laws 
apply depending on where in the world the user is located (which 
presumably has some correlation with the data location).”132 Thus, 
the position that Microsoft takes in the current case conforms to 
the business decisions that they have already made about how to 
operate as an international corporation.133 Microsoft’s general 
counsel, Brad Smith, states in a blog post, “We’ve long argued that 
it’s best for law enforcement to move forward in a way that 
respects people’s rights under their local laws.”134 
Microsoft’s perspective contrasts with similar companies like 
Facebook, Twitter, and Google, which “specify that the laws of 
their headquarters’ location (California) always apply.”135 This 
provides an advantage by “sheltering behind Californian 
jurisdiction [to give] the companies the ability to set their own, 
US-based [sic] standards for when data should be handed over. 
This means that they can provide services internationally, but can 
still refuse to hand over data to foreign governments who seek that 
data for nefarious purposes.”136 While this gives the Second Circuit 
another wrinkle to consider, companies should look closely at their 
own terms of service and rule of law clauses. Careful crafting of 
these contracts empowers companies to choose the laws that 
protect themselves and their users.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Judge Francis chose the correct quote to open his opinion in his 
district court ruling: “The rise of an electronic medium that 
disregards geographical boundaries throws the law into disarray by 
creating entirely new phenomena that need to become the subject 
of clear legal rules but that cannot be governed, satisfactorily, by 
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any current territorially based sovereign.”137 His statement 
succinctly clarifies the issue faced in the Microsoft case: for the 
first time a court is going to have to seriously deliberate where the 
boundaries of international jurisdiction apply concerning 
information on the internet. “This is something that we need to get 
right. The Microsoft case is a wakeup call that the current system 
is not doing a good job at serving either the needs of users or the 
needs of business.”138 
The United States government is unlikely to back down, 
trading its access to foreign data for economic growth and 
corporate competitiveness. While there are valid arguments for 
swiftly acting for law enforcement purposes, the judiciary should 
rule for Microsoft to preserve international civility and allow the 
U.S. tech sector to begin regaining trust across the globe. As 
Facebook’s Director of Public Policy Sarah Wynn-Williams stated 
in the fall of 2014, “. . . the bottom line is, people won’t use 
technology they don’t trust.”139 
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